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In re Uintah Basin, 133 P.3d 410 (Utah 2006) (holding: (1) ownership
of water rights requires existence of beneficial use, (2) federal contract
matters must be deferred to federal court, (3) state law governs recapture applications, and (4) the United States is subject to joinder in
state court water rights adjudication proceedings).
The Strawberry Water Users Association and the Strawberry High
Line Canal Company ("Strawberry") brought suit against the Bureau of
Reclamation ("Reclamation"), the United States, and the Department
of the Interior ("DOI"), on behalf of individual users, over competing
claims to water rights in the Strawberry Valley Project ("Project").
Strawberry petitioned for an interlocutory decree concerning Utah
general water rights adjudication statute in the Utah State District
Courts for the Third and Eighth Districts. Both courts dismissed the
motions and Strawberry appeals to the Supreme Court of Utah.
Reclamation initiated the Project in 1905 pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902 ("Act") to bring Project water from the Duchesne
River drainage through the Wasatch Mountains to lands in southern
Utah County. Prior to the completion of the Project, a lone user filed
an appropriation application which was eventually assigned to Reclamation. The United States used this certificate of appropriation to
prove its ownership of Project water. After completion of the Project
in 1915, individual settlers contracted with the United States for appropriation rights for beneficial use, which became rights to water in
perpetuity after repayment of construction costs. These users officially
formed Strawberry in 1922, and Strawberry assumed the federally contracted water rights in exchange for stock paid for by the users. Strawberry made the final payment for the Project to the United States in
1974, and removed any United States right to the water pursuant to the
combined federal reclamation contracts of the individual users represented by Strawberry. However, Reclamation initiated another Utah
project facility and constructed a new dam in 1985 that increased the
capacity of the Strawberry Reservoir. Consequently, the parties formed
the 1991 Operating Agreement ("Agreement") which guaranteed that
Strawberry would receive a regular annual delivery of water.
The current case spawned from three separate petitions filed by
Strawberry in the Third and Eighth District Courts for the State of
Utah for declarations of Strawberry's equitable title to Project water, its
rights to usage, and its right to file change applications independent of
the United States under Utah state law. In response, the United States
claimed federal reclamation contracts granted Strawberry its water
rights and therefore state law did not apply. The Utah Supreme Court
found no basis for this argument in case law or statute, and examined
the United States' counterclaim from a concurrent pending federal
court action to bring clarity to the issue. The United States repeated
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its argument that Strawberry's rights were solely contractual, and,' in
addition, advanced the claim that the Agreement superseded any prior
water rights Strawberry established. The court could not make a determination on the Agreement or the prior federal reclamation contracts because these issues were not before the court. Instead, the
court delineated between state and federal jurisdiction and Utah state
water law.
First, because the United States claimed that its certificate of appropriation gave it sole control of the Project water rights, the court
sought to define "ownership" under Utah water law. The court noted
that water rights were not the same as property rights associated with a
specific piece of property; rather, water rights are limited to use of a
certain amount of transitory water for a certain time, place, and purpose. The court found that the right of use limited ownership and that
ownership is based upon the beneficial use by the appropriator. A certificate of appropriation, absent beneficial use, is not sufficient on its
own to prove ownership of water rights. The court held that Strawberry had ownership of its water rights because its individual users
gained that right in perpetuity by applying the water to beneficial use.
From this definition, the court found that the Utah statutes entitled
Strawberry to file change applications and the United States was unable to legally resist.
Second, the court addressed the issue of the United States' claims
concerning federal reclamation contracts. Because the contracts were
based on federal statutes, the court deferred jurisdiction on these matters to the federal court. In light of the deferment, the court pointed
out that federal determination of Utah users' water rights may be in
conflict with the Congressional intention of Section 8 of the Act, which
stated that nothing in the Act would interfere with states' water rights
law.
Third, the court focused on the general adjudication of recapture
applications forwarded by both Strawberry and the United States, noting the strong precedents set forth in state law. Under Utah law, an
original appropriator can reuse water as long as it remains in his control, but once the water escapes to the channel from which it came or
some other channel, the appropriator cannot reclaim it from others
who have made use of it. Additionally, once irrigation water has reentered the natural water table, it is no longer owned by the irrigators
and is subject to subsequent appropriation and use by others. Because
of these well-established principles concerning the recapture of return
flow, the court found that Utah law governed. The court found the
United States' claim of a right to recapture seemingly groundless without a legitimate right of use, but granted state court the right to adjudicate these proceedings under Section 8 of the Act.
The court also responded to the United States' argument that, because this was a private dispute between itself and Strawberry, the
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United States had sovereign immunity from joinder in state water law
general adjudication. The court rejected the United States argument,
referencing Congressional intent to allowjoinder of the United States
in state court when the controversy relates to water rights as outlined in
the McCarran Amendment. In addition, the court noted the longreaching effects that the outcome of these adjudications could have on
downstream users as further reasoning against characterizing this controversy as a private dispute.
In conclusion, the court determined that federal jurisdiction was
appropriate for federal reclamation contract disputes, while issues of
water usage rights belonged within state jurisdiction. The United
States was subject to joinder in the proceedings of both the courts because of the McCarran Amendment. Finally, settling the disputes in
general adjudication was appropriate because the dispute reached beyond a mere private interaction.
The court remanded the case to the Eighth District Court, ordering a postponement of the Eighth District Court's proceedings pending the outcome of the Third District Court and the federal court.
The court ordered the Third District to defer to federal court law if the
parties focus adjudication on their contractual duties, and subsequently decide how the federally-interpreted contracts exist under
Utah water law.
Ryan Malarky
WASHINGTON
Fort v. Dep't of Ecology, 135 P.3d 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (holding
the futile call doctrine does not apply in the State of Washington).
In September 1921, a decree adjudicated the rights and priorities
to Beaver Creek resulting in 18 classes of water rights. Michael D. Fort
("Fort") held class 1, 8, and 9 rights under the decree. Class 1 is the
most senior right on Beaver Creek. Fort's point of diversion for all
three rights is the last one on Beaver Creek before its confluence with
the Methow River. In 2001, insufficient water was available to satisfy all
classes of water users on Beaver Creek. Accordingly, the Department
of Ecology ("Ecology") ordered all rights junior to class 5 shut off.
However, Fort continued to divert his class 8 and 9 rights. Ecology
issued Fort a notice of regulation. Fort appealed to the Pollution Control Hearings Board ("Board") which granted summary judgment in
favor of Ecology. Fort appealed to the Okanogan County Superior
Court, which denied his petition for judicial review. He then appealed
to the Court of Appeals of Washington.
The court limited its review of the Board's decision to the administrative record before the Board. The court held that it will only reverse
an agency decision if the decision is outside of its statutory authority or

